On September 29, 2025, the Southern District of New York dismissed a PFAS false advertising suit against Coca-Cola over its Simply juice products, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing and failed to show a link between third-party PFAS testing and his actual purchases.  The court found no plausible economic or benefit-of-bargain injury.  The plaintiff alleged that Simply juices were falsely marketed as “All Natural” despite the presence of PFAS.

The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to allege the tested samples were from his purchases or that PFAS presence rendered the products less valuable.  Relying on precedents such as TransUnion v. Ramirez and Axon v. Florida’s Natural Growers, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of standing.

The ruling reinforces that PFAS consumer mislabeling cases must connect laboratory testing to specific purchases and articulate a concrete injury to survive dismissal.  So, what lessons should be learned?

1. Laboratory Testing Link

Courts are dismissing PFAS mislabeling cases when the plaintiff fails to connect the specific product they purchased to the lab-tested sample.  Merely alleging that “testing of similar products” revealed PFAS, without tying that testing to the actual unit or batch purchased, is often viewed as too speculative.

2. Concrete Injury Requirement

Under TransUnion v. Ramirez and Spokeo v. Robins, plaintiffs must show a concrete, particularized injury, not just an abstract statutory violation or moral objection.  In PFAS suits, courts have required plaintiffs to allege:

• That they overpaid for a product falsely marketed as “PFAS-free” or “non-toxic,” and
• That the product they actually bought contained PFAS in measurable amounts.

Where plaintiffs only claim “fear of exposure,” “diminished value,” or cite general environmental harms, dismissal for lack of Article III standing is common.

3. Evidentiary and Pleading Implications

To survive Rule 12(b)(6):

• Plaintiffs must plead chain-of-custody facts linking test results to the purchased item (e.g., same UPC, batch code, or manufacturing lot).
• They should specify PFAS analytes and concentrations, not just allege “detectable PFAS” or presence of total organic fluorine.
• Plaintiffs often rely on third-party advocacy testing (e.g., Mamavation, Environmental Working Group), but courts treat those as insufficient when plaintiffs fail to link the test results to the specific products they purchased.

4. Practical Takeaway for Defendants and Counsel

For companies facing PFAS labeling suits, early motions to dismiss can succeed by emphasizing:

• Lack of product-specific testing linkage;
• Lack of concrete injury or economic harm;
• Compliance with trace-level detection limits (e.g., parts-per-trillion levels with no safety threshold exceeded).

The case is Lurenz v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 7:22-cv-10941 (S.D.N.Y.), filed 12/28/2022.  More details are available in a previous post.

A proposed class action against 3M and Chemours for concealing the risks of PFAS carpet treatments failed to establish standing, a Minnesota federal judge ruled on September 30, 2025.

As discussed in a previous post, the suit alleged violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), conspiracy to commit various state-law torts, and over one hundred other state-law claims.  Plaintiffs claimed 3M and Chemours conspired to hide PFAS hazards from carpet manufacturers and consumers, deceiving purchasers and causing property damage from PFAS contamination.

These allegations never made it off the starting block.  In its order, the Minnesota District Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they suffered an injury in fact or that the injury was fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct—two requirements for Article III standing.

“Plaintiffs never allege that the carpet they purchased actually has been treated with PFAS products,” the order states.  Moreover, “none of the allegations in the Complaint trace any potential injury to Defendants’ products, as opposed to the products developed by…nonparties.”

According to the court, the complaint relied on a report produced by California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) to argue that “most residential and commercial carpets are treated” with PFAS.  But since “most” could mean “a mere majority,” it “cannot support a reasonable inference that Plaintiffs’ carpets were treated with PFAS,” the order states.

Although these deficiencies alone warranted dismissal, the court went a step further, expressing concerns with the plaintiffs’ RICO charges and elements of their Minnesota common law claims.  For example, the court observed that “many courts” require that plaintiffs purchase products directly from the alleged antitrust violator to establish standing under RICO, while the plaintiffs in this case purchased their carpets from a third-party retailer.

The case is Peterson v. 3M Co., No. 24-CV-03497 (D. Minn.), filed 8/30/2024.