Ninth Circuit Partially Blocks California Climate Disclosure Laws on First Amendment Grounds

A split Ninth Circuit panel has paused parts of California’s climate disclosure requirements on First Amendment grounds, partially reversing a lower court ruling allowing them to take effect.

The case concerns two statutes enacted in 2023. SB 253 requires annual disclosures of Scope 1, 2, and 3 greenhouse gas emissions by companies doing business in California with more than $1 billion in annual revenue. SB 261 requires biennial disclosures of climate-related financial risk by companies with more than $500 million in annual revenue.

The preliminary injunction, issued November 9, 2026, blocks SB 253’s Scope 3 disclosure requirement and SB 261 in its entirety. The Ninth Circuit preliminarily sided with the business group plaintiffs, concluding that neither disclosure requirement concerns commercial speech and that neither survives strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.

However, the court allowed Scope 1 and 2 disclosures under SB 253 to proceed, finding that they likely qualify as commercial speech and satisfy intermediate scrutiny.

In a partial dissent, one judge on the panel would have paused all the climate disclosure requirements, finding that none of the disclosures concerned commercial speech.

The ruling came one day before the November 10, 2026, deadline for the first annual submission of Scope 1 and 2 emissions to the California Air Resources Board (CARB). The Ninth Circuit had already blocked SB 261 pending appeal, and SB 253 Scope 3 reporting was not scheduled to begin until 2027.

The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for it to determine whether the Scope 3 disclosure requirement is severable from the remainder of SB 253.

SB 253: Scope 1 and 2 Reporting Can Proceed

Scope 1 emissions are those from sources that a company owns or directly controls. Scope 2 emissions are those deriving from energy purchased by a company. Scope 3 emissions are those arising across a company’s value chain, including those from suppliers and customers that a company does not control.

To determine the appropriate level of scrutiny for each disclosure requirement, the court first assessed which concern commercial speech. Content-based speech regulations are generally subject to strict scrutiny and are presumptively unconstitutional. Commercial disclosures, however, may receive less demanding review. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, that review may take the form of intermediate scrutiny or the more deferential Zauderer standard for compelled disclosures that are “purely factual and uncontroversial,” the opinion states.

The court held that Scope 1 and 2 disclosures qualify as commercial speech. Rejecting arguments that commercial speech is limited only to speech proposing a commercial transaction, the court stated that the record demonstrates emissions data bears “on a business’s ability to raise capital and its overall profitability,” and that “investors, insurers, and other capital-market participants” use that data “to decide whether to transact and on what terms.”

The court did not decide whether Zauderer review was appropriate, finding that the disclosures meet even intermediate scrutiny’s more stringent standard. Reducing information asymmetries and greenhouse gas emissions are sufficient state interests, and the disclosures directly advance those interests, the court concluded.

Scope 3 Reporting Fails Strict Scrutiny

The court reached a different conclusion regarding SB 253’s Scope 3 disclosure requirement. Its focus on “diffuse third-party conduct,” the court found, is “insufficiently tethered to the reporting entity’s own operations and capital transactions to qualify as commercial speech.”

Applying strict scrutiny, the court found that the connection between Scope 3 emissions and “the reporting company’s specific risk exposure or profitability is too remote to make them pertinent to actual or potential investors.” And, unlike Scope 1 and 2 reporting, there is no evidence that Scope 3 reporting would reduce emissions, the court held.

SB 261 Climate Risk Disclosures Are Not Commercial Speech

SB 261 requires companies to disclose climate-related risks, opportunities, their material impacts, how the company identifies and evaluates them, and relevant company governance structures.

Such disclosures concern “normative, and inherently subjective, judgments about the significance of climate change, its long-term consequences for their businesses, and the extent to which it should influence their operations and strategy,” the opinion states.

The court held that those disclosures do not constitute commercial speech. They “go beyond providing economic information tethered to any commercial transaction” and instead require “value-laden judgments on a politically fraught subject.”

The disclosures also failed strict scrutiny. The court identified less restrictive means by which California could pursue its goals, including incentivizing voluntary disclosures or emissions reductions.

Partial Dissent Would Have Blocked All Disclosures

The majority opinion was written by Circuit Judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen and joined by District Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto. Circuit Judge Mark J. Bennett wrote separately to note that he also would have paused SB 253’s Scope 1 and 2 disclosures.

“Because the majority opinion can be read as equating investors’ interest in companies with consumers’ interest in products,” governments could require all manner of restrictions, the partial concurrence and partial dissent states.

For example, a disclosure of undocumented immigrant employees could be justified because it bears on potential employee turnover amid increased immigration enforcement. That example, and the disclosures here, are too far removed from disclosures communicating the terms of a commercial transaction, it argues.

The separate writing also challenges the majority’s acceptance of reducing information asymmetries as a substantial state interest. Information asymmetries exist in a variety of markets, including the employment market, where workers’ speech has been recognized as commercial speech, it notes.

“Under the majority opinion, then, can government compel individuals to publicly disclose information relevant to their employment—such as prior income, work attendance records, and reasons for past leave—subject only to lesser First Amendment scrutiny?” it asks.

The case is U.S. Chamber of Com. v. Sanchez, No. 25-5327 (9th Cir.). The underlying case is No. 2:24-cv-801 (C.D. Cal.).