DOJ Unveils First Unified Corporate Enforcement Policy

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On March 10, 2026, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released its first-ever department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP).  The CEP supersedes all existing enforcement policies at DOJ, including the Criminal Division’s policy that it closely resembles.  The CEP applies to corporate criminal cases except those relating to antitrust.

“Incentivizing corporate self-disclosures — while still permitting prosecutions in appropriate circumstances — allows the Department to quickly pursue culpable individuals, secure justice for victims, and deter white-collar crime, all while not unduly burdening American businesses,” DOJ stated in a press release.

Part I: Declination Path

Under the CEP, DOJ will decline to prosecute a company for criminal conduct if all of the following criteria are met:

  • The company voluntarily self-disclosed the misconduct to an appropriate DOJ criminal component.
  • The company fully cooperated with DOJ’s investigation.
  • The company timely and appropriately remediated the misconduct.
  • There are no aggravating circumstances, described as those that relate to the nature and seriousness of the offense, egregiousness or pervasiveness of the misconduct within the company, severity of the harm caused by the misconduct, or corporate recidivism.

Even where aggravating circumstances exist, prosecutors retain discretion to recommend a declination.  In all cases, the company must pay all disgorgement, forfeiture, restitution, and victim compensation.  All declinations will be made public.

Part II: “Near Miss” Path

Companies that do not qualify for the Part I Declination Path—because their self-report falls short of a qualifying voluntary disclosure or because aggravating circumstances warrant a criminal resolution—may still be eligible for eased enforcement under Part II, provided they fully cooperated and timely remediated.  Under Part II, DOJ shall:

  • Provide a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), absent particularly egregious or multiple aggravating circumstances.
  • Allow a term length of fewer than three years.
  • Not require an independent compliance monitor.
  • Provide a reduction of 50-75% off the low end of the US Sentencing Guidelines range.
Part III: All Other Cases

All remaining cases proceed under Part III, which grants prosecutors discretion to determine the appropriate resolution but caps any fine reduction at 50% under the Sentencing Guidelines.

How the CEP Differs from Existing Policy

The CEP’s three-part structure and criteria are largely identical to the DOJ Criminal Division’s enforcement policy, released in May 2025.  However, there are a few differences:

  • Broadened recidivism standard.  While the Criminal Division’s policy applied a fixed five-year lookback period, the CEP requires consideration of “criminal adjudication or resolution either within the last five years or otherwise based on similar misconduct” (emphasis added).
  • Reduced guaranteed relief under Part II.  The Criminal Division’s policy provided a fixed 75% reduction, but the CEP offers a range of 50–75%.
  • Faster eligibility notification. Prosecutors are now encouraged to notify companies of their Part I or Part II eligibility as soon as practicable.
  • Heightened interview requirements.  To be considered in full cooperation, a company must now make “agents who possess relevant information” available for interviews.
  • Company-tailored cooperation assessments.  DOJ must now consider a company’s “size, sophistication, and financial condition” when evaluating cooperation—a more flexible standard than the Criminal Division’s prior approach, which placed the burden of proof on companies to demonstrate financial impairment.
  • Greater transparency on cooperation credit.  Corporate resolution agreements must now include sufficient information explaining why a company received a particular level of cooperation credit.

The CEP also aligns with EPA’s new “Compliance First” enforcement policy, memorialized in December 2025, further signaling a broader regulatory shift toward industry self-policing and voluntary disclosure.  While a disclosure made solely to a regulatory agency generally does not qualify under the CEP, “good faith disclosures…may qualify if appropriate under the circumstances.”